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INTRODUCTION
The European Union Capital Requirements Directive (CRD,
Directives 2006/48 and 2006/49), implemented in the
Hungarian legal order in 2008, introduced the so-called Basel
II-based definition of banks’ capital requirement
2 (BIS, 2004)
to the Hungarian banking system. One of the main novelties
of the regulatory change is the consideration of operational
risk in the course of capital requirement allocation.
Operational risk refers to the risk of loss resulting from
inadequate or failed internal processes, personnel and
systems or from external events (e.g. fraud, business
disruption, execution and transaction errors, etc.) (BIS,
2004). The definition of this risk clearly illustrates that this
type of risk goes beyond the scope of financial risks (credit
and market risk) previously encompassing a capital
requirement allocation obligation.
Management of operational risks has become one of the new
central issues in both Hungarian and international financial
institutional practice in the recent past. Substantial losses
stemming from operational risk events (for instance the
recently exposed cases of fraud (e.g. the fictitious
transactions carried out by Jérôme Kerviel, incurring losses of
several billion euros for Société Générale, or Bernard
Madoff’s embezzlement of clients’ wealth worth tens of
billions of dollars), inadequate compliance with lending
standards on the subprime mortgage market, the fraud
perpetrated by Nick Leeson at Barings Bank in the mid-1990s
(for details on the case, see Jorion, 1999) or the 9/11 terrorist
attacks against the WTC in 2001) have contributed to
increased attention being focused on this topic. It is
important to underline that the definition of operational risk
includes legal risk, the role of which has also gained
significance. On the other hand, this increased interest has
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The capital adequacy regulation which came into force on 1 January 2008 for the Hungarian banking sector, in line with
the Basel II directives and generally applied in the European Union, brought the novelty of distinct management of
operational risk. Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes,
personnel and systems or from external events, which, similarly to financial risk, may result in substantial losses. The
regulation allows for various methods of calculating the capital requirement. Financial institutions may opt for simpler
approaches based on income indicators, or for more complex ones based on actual measures of risk. Based on the past one-
year period, it appears that the Hungarian banking system’s operational risk capital charge is significant compared to the
total capital charge, with the operational risk capital charge for 2009 Q1 amounting to HUF 120 billion, equivalent to
nearly 8% of the total capital requirements. The reported realised losses are lower than the capital requirement
(approximately HUF 13 billion in 2008), but the capital charge must provide a buffer in extreme, unexpected situations,
and conclusions on extreme values cannot be drawn based merely on one year of observation, therefore this discrepancy
could be completely justified. Regarding institutions’ choice of approach, it can be established that larger institutions prefer
more complex methods in both foreign and Hungarian practice. This is due to the fact that the introduction of more
advanced approaches comes with a higher fixed cost, which larger institutions can absorb more easily over the short term,
and moreover, they can take better advantage of the benefits offered. Overall, the conscious management of operational risk
and application of more developed methods aimed at managing such risks can contribute to the stability of the financial
system.
Dániel Homolya: The impact of the capital
requirements for operational risk in the
Hungarian banking system
1
1The author would like to thank the participants of the internal debate which took place within the MNB for their constructive comments, especially Anikó Szombati,
Tamás Czeti , Gábor P. Kiss, Márton Nagy, dr. Péter Rajczy and Róbert Szegedi, Péter Tabák for the modification recommendations on the first version of this article,
furthermore for dr. Mária Móra (Hungarian Banking Association) and Gergely Szabolcs (Bankárképzõ Consulting and Training) on behalf of the HunOR database
operating under the umbrella of Hungarian Banking Association for their suggestions and remarks. At the same time, this article reflects the author’s opinion, who
takes sole responsibility for any possible errors in it.
2 Capital requirement signifies the level of regulatory capital providing adequate safety for a bank to be able to withstand possible losses while being able to fulfil its
payment obligations, in other words the losses should affect those providing regulatory capital (primarily owners). Regulatory capital, a special term used by banking
literature and regulation, is defined as the total of equity and Tier 2 capital.THE IMPACT OF THE CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS ON OPERATIONAL RISK IN THE...
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been determined by changes in regulation, the so-called Basel
II process. In Hungary, financial institutions and the groups
managed by such institutions must comply with the Basel II
regulation based on the new Act on Credit Institutions and
Financial Enterprises (Act CXII of 1996 on Credit
Institutions and Financial Enterprises), while investment
companies and the groups managed by such companies must
comply with the new Act on Investment Companies and
Commodity Brokers (Act CXXXVIII of 2007 on Investment
Companies, Commodity Brokers and the Regulations
Governing their Activities). In contrast to previous practice,
the new regulatory framework requires institutions to
allocate capital to operational risk, in addition to credit and
market risk,
3 forming a sort of “buffer” against such risks and
reflecting the fact that a larger operational risk event can be
fatal for an institution. The two main categories of
operational risk are, on the one hand, frequent events with
low impact, and rare events with extremely high impact on
the other hand. The latter type of event and the combination
of risks are especially dangerous. In international practice,
the case of Barings bank mentioned above can be brought up
as a basic case of financial and operational risks forming a
fatal combination. In the case of Barings bank, a rogue trader
concluded transactions considered fraudulent, then a
negative turn ensued on the market which would have
triggered big losses in and of itself, but coupled with the
fraud, led to the collapse of Barings. Of course, operational
risk may also cause damage when it is combined with credit
risk, generating cases where loose lending policy is
exacerbated by inadequate compliance with internal rules.
Regulation based on Basel II defines three broad methods for
calculating the operational risk capital requirement:
• Basic indicator approach (BIA) – the capital charge is 15%
of the average gross income of the previous three years.
This method can be used without adhering to separate,
precise operational risk management requirements. Gross
income is defined as net interest income, net non-interest
income, net profit realised on financial transactions and
other incomes.
• The standardised approach (TSA) – the capital charge is 12-
18% of the average gross income of the previous three
years, according to business line. Data collection and risk
management requirements must be fulfilled, i.e. banks must
have an operational risk management function which
exposes, analyses, measures, reports and manages
operational risk factors.
4
• Advanced measurement approach (AMA) – in this case, the
capital charge is based on actual risk measurement: the
extent of one-year 99.9% VaR
5 must be determined.
Institutions authorised to use this method have to satisfy
strong risk identification, risk assessment, monitoring and
risk management requirements. Measurements for
estimating risk are not simply based on historical data;
internal controls and the business environment must also
be captured, using external data as well. The capital charge
of the advanced measurement approach, similar in
complexity to the ratings-based approach (IRB) applying to
credit risk, is the one-year 99.9% VaR. In other words,
capital which is capable of covering the losses of all years,
the losses of which are only exceeded every 1,000 years
must be allocated, with these parameters
Due to their nature, the basic indicator and standardised
approaches are considered “simpler methods”. The AMA
allows sophisticated risk assessment, determining a capital
charge based on the actual risk profile. The method of capital
requirement calculation based on gross income was
determined based on the significant relationship between
gross income and annual losses stemming from operational
risk, demonstrated by certain studies (of which the most
frequently cited is Shih et al., 2000). However, upon more
careful reflection, the simpler methods do not necessarily
reflect the profile of operational risk to financial institutions.
Although it is logical that if an institution’s gross income is
higher, then the institution itself is bigger, if an institution
suffers a greater loss precisely because of its greater
operational risk losses, then its capital charge decreases in the
opposite direction of risks. Of course, it may also decrease
the available regulatory capital remaining after the
appropriate accounting settlements following the claiming of
losses and other items, thereby decreasing the overall level of
capital adequacy. Recognising this effect, which materialises
perceptibly in the current crisis environment due to falls in
profitability, the authorities responsible for creating capital
requirement regulations have begun to consider devising
alternative indicators in order to determine capital
requirement levels which reflect risks better, even under the
simpler methods.
3The literature on risk management defines credit risk as the risk of loss stemming from a debtor’s non-payment, while market risk is defined as the risk of loss
stemming from a change in the market price of financial assets. 
4The regulation enables banks with large retail and commercial banking activities to use the so-called alternative standardised approach (ASA). In this case, the
authorised institution may use 3.5% of the business line’s previous three years’average exposure instead of gross income in the two aforementioned business lines.
5VaR is the abbreviation for “value-at-risk”. For example, a one-year VaR figure of 99.9% reflects the value which we cannot lose more than with a 99.9% probability in
one year.The hierarchy between the various methods for determining
the capital requirement is not only reflected in the increased
requirements and the one-way direction of switching method
(by default, one can only progress along the spectrum of
approaches from simpler methods towards the more
advanced ones, and not vice versa), but also in the amount of
the capital charge. The findings of impact studies introducing
the new regulation (see for example CEBS, 2006) show that
based on general tendencies, the observed banks are better off
switching from the basic indicator approach to the
standardised approach, and from the standardised approach
to the advanced measurement approach, as the amount of
capital charge decreases in parallel with the increasing
complexity of the method chosen. In the case of certain
banks, nevertheless, the capital requirement – which
generally decreases as a given method’s complexity increases
– may show opposing change.
In the following section, I will first examine the operational
risk capital charges and the available data on the operational
risk losses of the Hungarian banking system, followed by an
analysis of the driving forces of the choice of capital
requirement method, comparing Hungarian tendencies with
an overview of the operational risk method selection of large
international banks.
THE OPERATIONAL RISK CAPITAL
CHARGES OF THE HUNGARIAN BANKING
SYSTEM AND THE SIZE OF RECENT
LOSSES
At the end of 2009 Q1, the banking sector’s total operational
risk capital charge was HUF 120 billion, which is 8.96% of
the previous (year-end 2007) credit and market risk “Basel I
conform” capital charge. The change in capital requirement
calculation regime led to a decrease in the credit risk capital
requirement, which was partly offset by the introduction of
the operational risk capital requirement. The intention of
regulators of maintaining the overall capital requirement at
the same level, but distributing it differently among the
various risks to better reflect financial institutions’ risk profile
is thus fulfilled. Over the past year, the proportion of the
operational risk capital charge within the Basel II-based
capital requirement was around 9%. Based on end-March
2009 data, this proportion has dropped to around 8% (in line
with the lower level of profits compared to previous years at
the end of 2008). The banking system’s operational risk
capital charges account for approximately 6% of the
regulatory capital available for covering risks (Chart 1).
From the perspective of their choice of method, Hungarian
commercial banks began to use the simpler methods in the
course of implementation in 2008. Although the BIA was the
most popular (60%) considering simply the number of
institutions opting for it, based on the own funds available for
solvency purposes, 18% of institutions introduced the BIA,
82% chose the standardised method, while the sole
institution which employs the AMA accounts for 0.2%. Some
of the 13 institutions which use the standardised method may
switch in the future to the advanced measurement approach
after acquiring sufficient experience.
The Hungarian banking system’s level of operational risk
capital charge (HUF 120 billion at the end of March 2009)
provides an approximation of exposure to operational risk,
hence although this figure can be considered relatively low,
we cannot adequately assess its level. The Hungarian banking
system’s operational risk potential should be assessed based
on the timeline of actual losses and on scenario analyses,
calculations based on international comparisons and on the
basis of the extent of estimated potential losses, but there is
not enough information available as yet on operational risk
losses in the Hungarian banking system at the system-wide
level due to a lack of systematic data collection in the past. 
At the same time, the extent of operational risk can be
determined based on so-called COREP reporting, based on
Basel II. According to year-end 2008 data, the number of
operational risk losses which affect previous years but have
not yet been closed or which were recorded in the previous
four quarters was 5,274 in case of banks using the
standardised or advanced measurement approach, with total
losses amounting to HUF 13 billion, thus the average loss was
HUF 2.5 million. This level of loss accounts for 3-4% of the
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
MNB BULLETIN • JULY 2009 8
Chart 1
Proportion of the Hungarian banking sector’s
operational risk capital charge compared to the
banking system’s minimal capital charge and own
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Source: MNB.entire banking system’s pre-tax profits for 2008. However,
when assessing significance, it must be taken into account that
not every bank reports operational risk loss data based on the
standardised method; furthermore, reporting biases stemming
from insufficiently thorough disclosure of risk events may
occur, in turn related to the fact that the practical
implementation of the operational risk framework is still in its
initial phase. Nearly 75% of the value of reported losses falls
into the category of execution and processing errors, with the
retail business line coming out on top (68%) in a business line
breakdown. Examining the reported operational risk loss
events which affected the previous years but have not yet been
closed, or which were recorded in the preceding four quarters
by quarter reveals diversity. Although the order of magnitude
of aggregate losses is quasi unchanged, the internal
distribution by type of event and business line varies, which is
linked to the fact that the addition of one quarter can cause
significant changes in short, less robust timelines. Banks only
report individual loss data to the COREP database to a limited
extent, reporting only 10% of the events causing the highest
losses, but at least 10 events. Only limited conclusions can be
drawn on the events from this censored, selected database. In
any case, the analysis of the data revealed that the distribution
of loss events has a fat tail, in other words the probability of
losses substantially higher than the average loss is relatively
high. Chart 2 shows the fat tail and that the loss distribution
calculated based on the data set containing the truncated,
censored data is well fitted to the lognormal distribution on
the body of the distribution, although the lognormal
distribution often used for operational risks which can be
fitted to these same data has a slightly fatter tail. Of course,
the complete distribution function could be drawn based on
all the loss data, which may possibly yield a more precise fit,
and a larger sample size would allow more extreme events to
be included in the sample.
Stemming from the characteristics of operational risk, an
institution’s internal data often do not give an accurate
picture of its full operational risk profile. This is why the
advanced measurement approach prescribes the use of
external data to disclose rare events which have a strong
impact (so-called tail events). An important initiative
launched by the members of the Hungarian banking system is
the HunOR Hungarian Operational Risk Database, which
began operation in 2007 under the auspices of the Hungarian
Banking Association. Twelve banks, representing over 50%
of the entire banking sector’s asset portfolio, anonymously
share individual loss events with a booked impact of over
HUF 50,000 in the framework of the data consortium. This
initiative represents a great advantage for the participating
banks, allowing the disclosure of Hungary-specific
operational risk events and comparison with institutions of
presumably similar operational risk profile. The HunOR
database began operating by registering operational risk loss
events booked after 1 January 2007 in the database. 
A cooperation agreement was concluded between the Magyar
Nemzeti Bank and the Hungarian Banking Association,
pursuant to which the MNB receives data containing data
aggregated from the HunOR database. The database’s
significance can be reinforced based on the data thus made
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Note: data of banks using the standardised or advanced measurement approach. Loss events registered in 2008 or not yet closed.
Source: MNB.
Fit of the distribution’s tail 
(rarer events with larger impact)
Fit of the distribution bodyavailable, as nearly four thousand events with booking dates
until end of 2009 Q1 were shared by the participating
institutions, and the total registered loss for this period
reached HUF 13 billion (Source: Hungarian Banking
Association HunOR Hungarian Operational Risk Database).
All of this shows that recent operational risk loss events are
not of determining significance in and of themselves. At the
same time, an unchanged level of operational risk can, with
the increased financial risks in the current crisis, further
deteriorate the position of financial institutions, moreover
financial institutions’ employees may be more prone to error
under stress. As a result, the interaction of various types of
risk has intensified, with operational risk events triggering
credit risk events, and vice versa (through a sort of
endogeneity). Furthermore, legal risk also plays a more
important role in the current environment, as clients become
more sensitive in the dire economic climate, so potential legal
proceedings stemming from non-compliance with the norms
of fair market behaviour (for instance selling overly risky
products to clients without providing them appropriate
information) may lead to substantial financial losses and dent
reputation, deteriorating already gloomy bank profitability
prospects.
DRIVERS FOR CHOICE OF OPERATIONAL
RISK APPROACH
The choice of risk management approach may be determined
by several factors. A part of these factors may be related to
the nature of the financial institution’s activities (size,
efficiency, risk exposure), while other factors – impossible or
difficult to measure accurately – (organisational culture,
managers’ risk consciousness) may also come into play. The
common traits of financial institutions using the more
advanced operational risk approaches is also worth
examining, i.e. whether it is attributes related to size or
profitability which co-vary with the choice of method. In the
following section, I will first present the data pertaining to
foreign institutions, before moving on to Hungarian
institutions’ practices in terms of method selection.
Operational risk method selection practice of large,
foreign institutions
I founded my analysis on data pertaining to financial
institutions’ choice of operational risk approach on the one
hand, and on financial institutions’ profitability and balance
sheet data on the other. Data pertaining to the choice of
operational risk approach pose the biggest problem at
present, as in countries where capital allocation for
operational risk has been compulsory since 1 January 2008,
data on operational risk are only included in annual reports
for 2008, which would have to be compiled one by one. Of
course, larger institutions are much more transparent due to
the reputational requirements imposed by their presence on
the stock exchange and their size, so I will use operational
risk data gleaned from a secondary data source containing the
world’s 100 largest institutions according to the banks’ or
bank groups’ equity capital.
I used two data sources for the analysis.
• The data source for operational risk data was the article
published in the October 2008 issue of the OpRisk &
Compliance (OR&C) journal (OpRisk & Compliance,
2008). The referenced article obtained its data from several
sources: data on equity capital from annual reports,
announcements in written and non-written media, articles
(e.g. The Banker magazine), the other data compiled from
annual reports, supervisory publications, software
company reports, while loss data was gleaned from the
database containing public operational risk loss data,
operated by the software company SAS. In light of the fact
that OR&C magazine is the leading journal of the
operational risk management profession, I considered the
data published in it to be sufficiently reliable.
•  Data pertaining to profitability, size and liquidity were
obtained from the Bureau van Dijk “BankScope” database.
BankScope is a database containing micro-level bank data,
often used in academic circles and by financial institutions
and central banks for comparing countries or preparing
analyses based on individual bank data (Bhattacharya,
2003).
•  Based on BankScope’s brochure, the database contains
information on 23,000 banks, with all of the relevant banks
of every country worldwide included in the database
(Bureau van Dijk, 2008).
Fairly detailed analyses can thus be carried out based on the
available database
6, among which this article will only
present the most interesting findings. Of the 100 institutions
in the sample, 90 have introduced operational risk
management and capital charge allocation based on Basel II.
Among the largest banks, 8 employ the basic indicator
approach, 43 the standardised approach and 39 the most
complex advanced measurement approach. Of course, some
of the institutions using simpler approaches intend to switch
MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK
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6 Even the smallest bank in the sample has equity capital of USD 5.7 million and a balance sheet total of USD 62 billion, which means that in comparison, even the
smallest institutions and bank groups are slightly larger than the bank group led by the largest Hungarian bank (OTP banking group).to the advanced measurement approach in the future; 13
institutions expressed such an intention. Based on the data
included in the database, I examined the statistical
correlation between fundamental size and profitability
indicators and the choice of operational risk method among
the institutions using Basel II-based approaches. The
findings presented in Table 1 suggest that there is a clear,
significant correlation between size indicators and the
operational risk approach chosen, while no clear correlation
can be established with profitability indicators. In other
words, the larger an institution is, the more complex its
operational risk approach, while from the aspect of
profitability, more profitable financial institutions do not
show an inclination towards either simpler or more
advanced approaches. This leads to the conclusion that using
more advanced methods yields economies of scale for larger
institutions, as higher profits can be achieved with equal or
comparable fixed costs.
Of the 100 institutions examined, 36 are members of the
operational risk data consortium, which enables the more
effective measurement of operational risk. On the
international scene, there are several databases operating on
a national level, similar to the one in Hungary (for instance
DIPO in Italy or the Landesbanks’ DAKOR database in
Germany), as well as those stretching beyond national
boundaries, such as the ORX database, established by the
largest banks. Statistical analyses show that consortium
membership is strongly correlated with the applied
methodology’s complexity.
7
Hungarian banks’practice in choosing their
operational risk method
Several articles have already been written on Hungarian
banks’ operational risk management practices (including the
article published in issue 4, 2007 of the Hitelintézeti Szemle).
No comprehensive analysis has yet been published on
Hungarian banks’ operational risk management practices,
and therefore my subjective experience and Hungarian
Financial Supervisory Authority (2005) represents a sort of
guideline from this perspective. Hungarian banks clearly
began focusing on operational risk as a part of the Basel II
process, although some banks had already begun to establish
special risk management practices for managing certain risks
(IT security, risks related to the workout process). Internal
control was a fundamental starting point in this process.
Given the strong foreign presence in the Hungarian banking
sector, parent banks provide strong methodological
guidelines for operational risk management. This is especially
important in light of the fact that in the course of the Basel II
process, not only individual, but also group-level adequacy is
important. When developing operational risk management
practices, banks undertook efforts to develop risk
identification, measurement, monitoring and management,
the first step of which was the collection of data pertaining to
loss events. HunOR’s role from this perspective is vital, as a
standardised framework was developed for the participating
banks, allowing banks, sharing their experiences, to develop
adequate operational risk loss data collection in line with the
criteria set forth by the regulation. Overall, it can be said that
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Note: the values of the Kendall’s tau-b type correlation indicator, which can be used for ordinal data in correlation calculations, are shown. Similarly
to the “traditional” linear correlation indicator, Kendall’s tau-b varies between –1 and +1; the higher the absolute value of a given indicator, the stronger
the correlation. A value of +1 represents perfect covariance, while –1 represents perfectly opposing variance. Significance (p-value) shows the probability
of the given indicator equalling zero, i.e. there being no relation between the two timelines. The coding of the chosen operational risk methodology is
the following: 1: BIA, 2: TSA, 3: AMA.
Source: own calculation based on data from OpRisk & Compliance (2008) and Bureau van Dijk (2008).
Correlation with the chosen Two-sided level of significance  Sample size
operational risk methodology’s  (p-value)
code 
Total tier 1 capital (USD million) 0.37 0.00 90
Balance sheet total (USD million) 0.36 0.00 90
Return on Average Assets (ROAA) (%) –0.05 0.58 90
Return On Average Equity (ROAE) (%) 0.07 0.42 90
Table 1
Statistical correlation between size and profitability attributes and the operational risk approach used
7 A correlation value of 32% (Kendall’s tau-b measuring rank correlation) exists between the external database member's proxy (1: membership, 0: no membership) and
the method complexity indicator (0: Basel I, 1: BIA, 2: TSA, 3: AMA), with a rather high level of significance (p=0.02%).Hungarian banks are taking significant steps towards
adopting the best international practice, although few
Hungarian banks perform modelling at present, due to the
lack of maturity of implementation on the one hand, and
centralised modelling on the level of parent banks on the
other hand. The reasons behind this could be that as there is
relatively little data and experience on operational risk,
developing databases of sufficient volume and methods
yielding robust results can initially only be achieved at the
bank group level. At the same time, an important criterion is
that the calculations pertaining to subsidiary banks must
reflect local idiosyncrasies, and furthermore the use of local
models may become necessary as the amount of local
experience grows.
Based on year-end 2008 data, the numerical majority of
Hungarian banks use the method based on the basic indicator.
At the same time, if we consider the proportion based on the
balance sheet total or regulatory capital, about 80% of the
banking system uses the standardised approach (Table 2).
Only one smaller institution in the banking sector currently
uses the advanced measurement approach, and some
institutions currently applying simpler approaches intend to
switch to the AMA in the short or medium term. The
Hungarian banking system is therefore split between users of
the basic indicator approach (“simpler institutions” in this
perspective) and the standardised approach (“more advanced
institutions” in this perspective). Considering average values,
year-end 2008 data reveals that larger Hungarian banks tend
to be the ones using the more complex standardised approach,
which has a relatively lower capital adequacy requirement and
higher profitability (Table 2). From these ostensible
correspondence, correlation analyses highlight the covariance
and opposing variance of balance sheet total based size and
the capital adequacy indicator. At the same time, the
profitability of banks using the basic indicator or the
standardised approach does not differ significantly.
Twelve Hungarian financial institutions (typically
commercial banks) participate in the HunOR database. From
the perspective of method complexity, a pattern similar to
that of foreign banks with external operational risk database
membership appears. While 75% of the member banks of
HunOR, falling under the scope of Basel II, and banks of
which the parent bank is a member of HunOR use the
standardised approach, this proportion is only 17% among
non-members of HunOR. In other words, membership in an
external database also indicates the choice of more complex
methods in the Hungarian banking system as well,
materialising in the form of the standardised approach at
present, and hopefully in the use of the advanced
measurement approach in future.
CONCLUSIONS
This analysis focuses on the operational risk aspects of the
introduction of the capital adequacy regulation which came
into force in the Hungarian banking system from 1 January
2008 in line with Basel II. The regulation allows financial
institutions falling within its scope to choose their
operational risk method, either opting for simpler
approaches based on profitability indicators or for more
complex ones based on actual measures of risk. Based on the
past one-year period, the Hungarian banking system’s
operational risk capital charge was significant compared to
the total capital charge, with the operational risk capital
charge for Q1 2009 amounting to HUF 120 billion, or nearly
8% of the total capital charge. The reported realised losses
are lower compared to the capital requirement
(approximately HUF 13 billion in 2008), but the capital
charge must provide a buffer in extreme, unexpected
situations, and conclusions on extreme values cannot be
drawn based merely on one year of observation, therefore
this discrepancy is completely justified. Regarding
institutions’ choice of approach, larger institutions prefer
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Note: non-audited, non-consolidated data from end-2008.
Source: MNB.
Chosen method  Number of  Balance sheet Regulatory  Average Average Average ROE Average ROA
institutions  total based capital based  balance sheet capital  (percentage) (percentage)
(pcs) share share total adequacy
(percentage) (percentage) (HUF billion) (percentage)
BIA 21 19.40 18.06 270 12.02 5.12 0.27
TSA 13 80.42 81.72 1805 10.84 14.34 1.02
AMA 1 0.18 0.22
Table 2
Hungarian financial institutions’choice of operational risk approach and the main attributes of the various
groupsmore complex methods in both foreign and Hungarian
practice. This is due to the fact that the introduction of more
complex approaches comes with higher fixed costs, which a
larger institution can allocate more easily to its operational
risk project, and moreover, they can take better advantage of
the capital requirement benefits offered by the method’s
complexity. Only one smaller actor in the Hungarian banking
system applied the most complex, so-called advanced
measurement approach as at June 2009, presumably trying to
benefit from economies of scale on a bank group level and to
adopt the group-level approach locally with relatively low
costs. Overall, the conscious management of operational risk
and the use of developed methods aimed at managing them
can contribute to the financial system’s stability, which also
deserves more attention given the current gloomy economic
climate and the escalation of financial risk. As a continuation
of this analysis, it would be worth comparing the choice of
operational risk capital allocation approach with that of
credit risk in future, which also allows for choice between
simpler and more complex methods (standard and internal
rating based approach), furthermore, country-specific factors
in method selection patterns would also be worth examining.
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